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Abstract:
We consider a possible determinant of regulatory decisions by public utility commissioners: the desire to
remain in office. We examine regulatory exit, where a regulator leaves a commission during a term or is
not re-appointed/re-elected. With data from US states, we empirically investigate several hypotheses
motivated by a political agency model of regulatory decision-making. Our empirical results generally
support the hypotheses, including that higher electricity prices lead to ousting, that ousting is less common
where it is more costly for the principal to whom the regulator reports, and that ousting is more likely
where regulators are more accountable or are more likely to share the principal‘s preferences. Furthermore,
the results provide limited evidence that regulatory exit is not due mainly to the revolving door. Ousting
also appears to lower future electricity prices.
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I. Introduction
Regulatory agencies have played an important role in network industries for
almost a century in the U.S., and regulatory authorities often argue that their
independence is a crucial aspect of their design.1 Regulators, however, do not make
decisions in a vacuum. We look at whether regulators have incentive to align their
decisions with the preferences of those who appoint or elect them, or whether their
decisions are independent of such influence. That is, does political pressure discipline
regulators? We examine the tenure of state public utility commissioners and regulated
electricity prices to address both meanings of ―discipline‖. First, are non-reappointment,
non-reelection, and political pressure to leave office before a term is up used to punish
regulators who contradict the preferences of the appointing or electing body? Such
punishment we refer to collectively as ―ousting‖. Furthermore, does ousting regulators
discipline their replacements, in the sense that future regulatory decisions are more in line
with the preferences of the electorate or the governor? We demonstrate econometrically
that ousting is of empirical significance in both questions. We contribute to the political
economy literature on regulation by showing that in the absence of incentive-pay
contracts, which are usually not possible to offer to state regulators,2 ousting appears to
be another mechanism used to motivate and restrain regulators. The results are also of
1

For example, in its regulatory guide for foreign regulators, the FCC states that ―Establishing an
independent regulatory authority is a crucial factor in the success of any country‘s effort to introduce
competition and to privatize and liberalize the telecommunications sector‖
(http://www.fcc.gov/connectglobe/sec1.html, visited July 1, 2010).
2
The pay of regulators is typically determined by the legislature, sometimes directly and elsewhere by
pegging commissioner salaries to that of other public positions (e.g., in Maine the salary of commissioners
is equal to that of an Associate Justice of the Superior Court; Maine Rev. Stat. §6-A). One exception is that
in some states the governor determines which commissioner serves as chair, and the position of chair
commands a higher salary (e.g., in Maine the salary of the chair is equal to that of the Chief Justice of the
Superior Court). No state determines the pay of PUC commissioners based directly on their regulatory
decisions, and in some states there are explicit statutory restrictions on receiving any compensation other
than salary and travel expenses for serving as a commissioner.
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practical interest to policymakers concerned about the independence of regulatory
decision-making.
Ousting is related to both prominent explanations in the political economy
literature for regulatory decision-making: public choice theory and capture theory (or
more broadly in the latter case, the economic theory of regulation). Public choice
theories look at the role of constituents‘ preferences in shaping regulatory outcomes.
Public choice theory indicates that institutions for choosing regulators are important, and
many studies have looked at whether elected regulators are more pro-consumer than are
those appointed by governors and legislatures.3 Boyes & McDowell (1989) summarize
the early literature (e.g., Costello, 1984) as finding no consistent pattern of elections
leading to pro-consumer outcomes. Later work by Besley and Coate (2003), however,
finds convincing evidence that electing officials leads to lower prices and less pass
through of costs to electricity rates.4
Instead of following the literature in looking only at the determinants of regulated
prices, our work takes ousting as the main phenomenon to explain, thus providing an
explanation for why regulators might make good on their promises. In the public choice
approach to regulation, the mechanism by which a past appointment or election translates
into current regulatory behavior is typically not modeled explicitly. It is either assumed,
as in Downsian public choice models,5 that regulatory candidates can pre-commit to
policies, or that the regulator‘s type (and hence future actions) is known (see Besley and
3

Such studies are but one strand of the large literature looking at the determinants of regulatory decisions.
See Dal Bó (2006) for a review.
4
Elections matter through less-direct channels as well. Guerriero (2006) finds evidence that when states
switch to electing the administrative law judges that can overturn regulatory decisions, less cost is passed
through to consumers of regulated services.
5
Downs (1957) shows that when politicians are able to commit to policies, their choices satisfy the
preferences of the median voter.
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Coate (2003) for a model incorporating the latter assumption). In neither case is it clear
why the regulator should be viewed as an automaton acting in a predetermined,
predictable way once in office. This assumption is not innocuous, because once in office
the regulator‘s incentives may change. The choice to support a particular policy before
serving office may be dynamically inconsistent. For example, to be elected, a candidate
for a public utility commission (PUC) may promise to lower electricity prices for
consumers, but once in office may find that supporting higher prices will secure better
post-commission employment from the regulated industry. Alesina (1988) shows that
lack of commitment causes the predictions of Downsian models to break down when
voters are forward looking and rational.
Our work explores an explanation for why regulators might follow through on
their promises, even in the absence of binding commitments to platforms: regulators care
about keeping their positions and act to please those who have the power to terminate
them.6 Our approach is thus similar in spirit to the ―retention rule‖ literature based on
Holmstrom‘s career concerns model (Banks and Sundaram, 1998; Ashworth, 2005).7 By
accepting a seat on a PUC, a commissioner occupies a highly political position, exposed
to pressure from the governor, the legislature, voters, and special interest groups (Schuler,
1996), and ousting is not an idle threat. In some cases, ousting of regulators is public and
dramatic. For example, in 2006, the Maryland legislature attempted to remove all of the
state‘s public service commissioners by dissolving the commission after a regulatory
decision that greatly increased retail electricity prices. For every public ousting of a
commissioner, there are probably far more cases in which back-channel pressure from the
6

We do not suggest that regulators have this as their only goal, merely that it is one factor (perhaps among
many) that may have empirical relevance.
7
Unlike in these models, the regulator in our model does not undertake costly actions to reveal his type.
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governor‘s office or a sense that the electorate is unhappy with regulatory performance
causes commissioners to seek other employment ―voluntarily‖ or to decline to run for
another term.
The other main economic approach to explain regulatory decision-making is
capture theory, which argues against allowing complete regulatory independence.8 Both
capture theory (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974) and its expanded version, interest group
theory (Peltzman, 1976), assume that industry can pay off regulators in order to influence
outcomes toward industry.9 Such payments include ―revolving door‖ offers of postregulatory employment in the regulated industry,10 which is widespread (Eckert, 1981).11
The empirical literature on capture theory regarding whether the revolving door leads to
pro-industry regulatory decisions is mixed (Cohen, 1986; Dal Bó, 2006), and there is
apparently no recent evidence from the energy industry.12 Nonetheless, given the
potential empirical relevance of capture theory for regulatory performance, any public
choice theory of regulation ignoring capture theory is incomplete. We explore the
implications of capture theory as an alternative explanation for ousting in our empirical

8

See Boehm (2007) for a guided survey of the literature on capture as it applies to regulation.
Industry can also offer the stick instead of the carrot to keep regulators in line by protesting regulatory
decisions. Leaver (2009) finds evidence to support that regulators seek to minimize industry ―squawking‖
to enhance their reputation and post-commission employment prospects. Industry can also shape
regulatory outcomes by channeling campaign contributions to the state legislators who appoint or confirm
regulators (de Figueiredo and Edwards, 2007).
10
Che (1995) points out that the revolving door may also take subtler forms such as consulting
arrangements with the regulated firm after the commissioner steps down from the PUC.
11
A former advisor at the FCC states that in the federal context, the revolving door (from a regulatory
agency to the regulated industry) is ―a problem much bigger than the FCC and it‘s all around town.‖
(Curran, 2009).
12
The revolving door remains of current policy interest. Upon attaining office, President Obama imposed
new restrictions on lobbying by senior level government and regulatory appointees after they leave public
service. Commissioners who leave the FCC (for example) are now barred for two years from appearing
before the Commission (twice as long as before) and are indefinitely barred from lobbying FCC officials
(Buskirk and Bender, 2009).
9
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investigation. Our empirical work thus adds to the large body of econometric work
testing the implications of the economic theory of regulation (interest group theory).13
To explore the link between regulatory decisions and ousting, we examine the
impact that pricing decisions have on regulators‘ tenure with a simple model of political
agency. That is, we look at whether prices that are out of line with the preferences of the
political master of the regulator (the principal) lead to ousting. We assume that the
principal prefers lower to higher prices, after controlling for generation cost. We also
assume that the cost of ousting is lower for governors. When regulators are appointed,
they must please not only the median voter (who elects the regulators‘ masters) but also
the master (governor‘s office or legislature) itself. The theory also indicates that ousting
will be more common when the regulator holds preferences that are farther from those of
the governor or voters and when accountability for individual regulators is higher.
In the empirical model, we take the theory to the data to test various hypotheses
suggested by the theoretical model. We proceed by finding regressors that proxy for
various parameters in the theoretical model. The regression estimates reveal interesting
patterns in the data and provide evidence in support of the political economy model as an
explanation for ousting. The empirical work also points toward—but does not prove
that— politically motivated ousting causes regulatory exit more by than capture does.
Our exploration relies on an exhaustive dataset of state public utility regulators from
1970 to 2005, including dates of service, whether the regulators completed their terms,
and whether they were reappointed or reelected. The regulatory decisions we focus on
are retail electricity prices. Other variables such as generation costs, the political

13

See section 3 of Noll (1989) for citations.
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proclivities of the regulators‘ superiors (the party of the governor and an ideological
score for voters), and the status of deregulation in each state also are included.14
In the econometric examination of the data, we analyze mid-term ousting with a
hazard rate model of the regulators‘ tenure, and analyze the outcome at time of reappointment/re-election with a binary dependent variable model. Results suggest that
ousting is not an empty threat: turnover of commissioners is higher when regulatory
commissioners allow higher prices, both for mid-term ousting and at time of reappointment/re-election. Ousting may therefore be a mechanism to punish regulators
who step out of line, and the degree of independence that regulators enjoy is thus open to
question.15 Electricity prices for industrial customers, who face lower costs to mount
political pressure than do general consumers, have a larger impact on ousting than do
standard retail rates.
Turning to political economy variables, we find that mid-term ousting is more
prevalent where regulators are appointed and where the governor has strong power to
remove commissioners unilaterally. Regulatory tenure is shorter where the median voter
is more liberal and where there is a greater difference between the ideology of the median
voter and the commissioner. Ousting is more common when the commissioner is in the
majority party on the PUC or is a member of a smaller PUC, both of which make a
commissioner more accountable for outcomes. All of these results are in accord with the
political agency model. Furthermore, most of these factors also decrease the likelihood

14

The present paper builds on the work of Jamison, Hauge, and Chiang (2009), who use similar data on
regulators to examine determinants of commissioners leaving office before their terms expire. Our work
differs by looking at individual commissioners instead of aggregating to the state level, examining reappointments and re-elections, and placing the empirical results in the context of a theoretical model.
15
Our work does not address the optimal degree of regulatory independence. We discuss this in our
concluding section.
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of the commissioner serving another term. In addition, commissioners who were not
appointed by the current governor and those whose party affiliation does not match that
of the governor are also less likely to serve again, results that are again consistent with
the model.
To explore capture theory as an alternative explanation of why we might see
regulators leaving office after what could be perceived as a pro-industry decision (as
Cohen (1986) found), we also explore the impact of restrictions on post-regulatory
employment. We find that regulatory tenure is shorter where there are such employment
restrictions, which points toward ousting and away from capture as the explanation for
the observed exit of commissioners. A suite of robustness tests lends further support to
the conclusion that the political economy of regulation determines ousting.
In the final part of our study, we address the deterrent effect of ousting by
considering whether the ousting of regulators lowers future electricity prices. Our results
show that there appears to be a curbing effect from punishing regulators by ousting:
subsequent electricity prices are lower than they otherwise would be. While the
magnitude of the effect is not large, the result is robust to several changes in specification.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we review a model of political
agency. In section III, we describe our data, link the empirical model to the theoretical
model, and formulate hypotheses to test. In section IV, we present our econometric
models for ousting and the regulatory determination of prices. In section V, we present
our empirical results. In a concluding section we discuss avenues that our results open
for future work on the optimal degree of regulatory independence. An appendix contains
some details of the econometric model not presented in the main text.
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II. Theoretical Considerations
To motivate the econometric work and to assist in interpreting the empirical
results, in this section we briefly describe a model of political agency from Besley (2006).
Instead of taking a typical mechanism design approach in which the principal offers
incentive pay or budgetary contracts to the regulator, we choose a model in which the
principal‘s only instrument is to oust the agent, which is more realistic for our application.
While the original context of Besley‘s model is a game between voters and an elected
politician, we apply it more generally to describe the regulatory process. Consider a two
period game between a principal, which may be the state‘s governor or voters (i.e., the
median voter) and the agent, the regulator. The agent‘s task is to perform an unobserved
action, which we take to be setting the markup of utility prices p over cost. The action, in
conjunction with the state of nature (also unobserved by the principal), determines the
principal‘s payoff. There are two types of regulators, congruent and dissonant.
Congruent regulators, who compose proportion π of the pool of potential regulators, hold
preferences identical to the principal‘s, who wants prices to move with cost. Dissonant
regulators earn a random, period-specific rent r from acting contrary to the principal‘s
wishes and raises prices out of line with cost. Both types of regulators benefit from
staying in office, however. The principal‘s task is to decide after observing its utility in
period one whether to oust the regulator.
In Besley‘s model, ousting when the prices are out of line with the principal‘s
preferences is part of an ―oust the louse‖ perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In the second
period, both types of agents act in their short-term interest. For the dissonant type, this
leads to an outcome that the principal does not wish—prices that are high relative to cost,
in our interpretation. Therefore, the principal screens agents on whether they acted
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congruently in period one. Good behavior leads to re-appointment or re-election, and bad
behavior leads to ousting and another draw of a regulator for period two. A dissonant
type acts congruently in period one only if his draw of dissonance rent in period one is
too small to make forgoing the expected benefits of holding office in period two
worthwhile.16 We make one conceptual addition to Besley‘s model. If the principal
incurred a random utility cost with mean θ when ousting the agent, then the amount of
ousting observed in replications of the game would be decreasing in θ.

III. Data and Hypotheses
In this section, we describe our data and posit several hypotheses concerning the
relationships between ousting on the one hand and prices and the political characteristics
of the regulatory setting on the other hand. We also present an alternative hypothesis that
helps distinguish between ousting and the revolving door as the explanation for regulators
leaving office.
Our data includes information on all US state public utility commissioners from
1970 through 2005. We collected information including starting dates for each term,
statutory and actual term ending dates, method of selection (election or appointment),17
and the political party of the commissioner. These data are from NARUC,18 Beecher
(2007), and various PUC web sites.19 The party affiliation of the commissioner is

16

See section 3.3 of Besley (2006) for the mathematical details of the model.
In S. Carolina and Virginia, the legislature elects the PUC commissioners. We count commissioners from
S. Carolina and Virginia as elected instead of appointed. The members of the Tennessee Regulatory
Authority are appointed by the governor, the lieutenant governor, and the Speaker of the House, and we
count them as appointed. The members of the D.C. Public Service Commission are appointed by the mayor.
In all other cases of appointment, the principal is the governor.
18
The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) published annual lists of
commissioners on every US PUC in its Annual Report on Utility and Carrier Regulation (1973-1990), and
Profiles of Regulatory Agencies of the United States and Canada: Yearbook (1991-1996).
19
Additional data on the party affiliation of regulators was obtained from Joe Craig, who collected the data
for Craig (2009).
17
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missing for about 6% of the observations, and so we estimate models with and without
controlling for party. We include all commissioners that were serving in 1970 or started
terms thereafter. States generally have three to five commissioners serving concurrently,
usually with overlapping terms, although some seats may be vacant at any given time. In
13 states, commissioners are elected during the entire sample period,20 and in four others,
they are elected at the beginning of the sample but appointed by the end.21 The length of
service varies significantly both within a state and across states depending on statutory
length of term, how often commissioners are re-appointed or re-elected, and how often
commissioners leave office before their terms end. We analyze all states and Washington,
D.C. over 35 years, giving us complete observations on 1,164 commissioners who
collectively serve 1,816 terms.
In the model in section II, ousting happens after period one. This formalization of
the interaction between the regulator and his political master stands in for all possible
opportunities for ousting. In actual regulatory practice, commissioners can be ousted
(formally or informally) in the middle of a term or between terms. The data show that 22%
of commissioners leave office before the expiration of their term, and that 49% of
commissioners eligible to serve a succeeding term do not. The reason for this career exit
by regulators is the focus of our analysis.
The electricity industry in the U.S. has been subject to regulation by state public
utility commissions, and we take the retail electricity price as a key variable of interest.
During the period of our study, states imposed different forms of price regulation, from

20

These states are Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Nebraska,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, and Virginia.
21
These states are Florida, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Texas. The trend away from election in recent
decades continues the longer trend triggered by the receding tide of early 20th century populism.
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traditional rate of return regulation, in which every attempted retail price change
necessitates a rate hearing at the PUC, to alternative forms of regulation such as price
caps and rate freezes. In the later years of our study, some states also deregulated (and
re-regulated, in some cases) parts of the electricity industry, although retail prices are
typically still regulated. Changes in utility costs, whether due to fluctuating fuel input
prices for electricity generation or restructuring of wholesale electricity markets, have led
to many opportunities over the years for PUCs to set new retail prices. When approving
changes, in most cases—77% of the time for residential prices in our data—PUCs raise
electricity prices. Despite the fact that PUCs in all states were designed to function as
independent regulatory agencies (Schuler, 1996),22 public outcry frequently greets even
necessary rate increases, not only from residents but also from politicians such as
governors eager to support their constituents.
Given these facts, we hypothesize that higher electricity prices lead to a higher
probability that a commissioner is ousted. In terms of the model, we thus associate
congruence with lower prices.

Hypothesis 1: Higher prices lead to more regulatory exit.

To test our hypothesis we use data on retail electricity prices charged to
residential and industrial customers. These data, calculated separately for residential and
industrial customers as the average revenue from electricity service (in $/KWH), are
available annually at the state level from the Department of Energy for the sample

22

The PUCs‘ decisions are ―not subject to revision by higher administrative authority, and nearly all claim
quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative power‖ (Schuler, 1996).
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period.23 To control for input costs, we use the weighted average fossil-fuel input cost
specific to inputs used in each state and year.24
If politics and pressure groups are the cause of ousting, then the more effective
the interest group, the greater the impact on ousting should be. Compared to residential
consumers, large industrial users of electricity have more at stake and are fewer in
number. They are also likely to be more efficient at pressuring regulators, because they
can form a more organized, focused interest group. All these characteristics make
industry a more effective interest group to counter the power of the regulated utilities
(Becker, 1983). Indeed, Anderson (1981) found that large electricity users play an
important role in determining energy policy. Thus, we refine Hypothesis 1 with the
expectation that industrial price changes have more effect on ousting than residential
prices.
One limitation of the commissioner data is clear. When a commissioner leaves
the PUC in the middle of a term, the data indicate neither the reason for leaving nor
whether exit was voluntary. Similarly, we do not see in the data whether a commissioner
ran for re-election (or wished to be re-appointed) if he25 did not serve a second (or
subsequent) term. Even if we observed whether a commissioner ran for re-election, we
would not limit our definition of ousting to losing an election because the choice to run is
23

The data are from series ESRCD from the DOE Energy Information Administration (EIA) State Energy
Data System (SEDS) datafile ―Prices, 1970-2006,‖ available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/states/_seds.html. Raw data are in dollars per Btu; we converted to $/KWH
assuming the EIA conversion factor of 3,412 Btu/KWH.
24
The data for 1970-1990 are from EIA database EIA-906, available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/eia906u.html. The fossil-fuel input cost index is created for
each state and year by multiplying the fraction of generation by electricity utilities from input i by its price,
where i = coal, oil, and natural gas. For years after 1990, the data source is the same database, available for
these years from http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa_sprdshts.html, and the same method is
used to create the cost index, except that all generators are included, not just utilities, since independent
power producers become much more important in latter years of the sample and because a few states had
no generation from utilities at all by 2005.
25
Since four-fifths of regulators are male in our data, we use the male pronoun throughout.
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endogenous. A choice not to run for a second term might still effectively be an ousting,
since it may have been clear to the commissioner that there was little chance of reelection.26 A major question of the paper, however, is whether regulators exit because
they are ousted—forced out for political reasons—or for unrelated reasons. Some
commissioners may move on to other employment for reasons other than political
pressure, retire before serving the maximum allowed number of terms, or even die in
office. Such reasons apart from the political economy of regulation will show up in the
regressions as additional noise. In econometric terms, exit for such reasons apart from
the political economy variables is incorporated in the error term in the regression
equation (or by the inherent randomness of the duration process in the Weibull
regressions). If a large proportion of exit is due to unrelated factors apart from ousting or
capture, then the large error term will cause imprecision in the coefficient estimates. In
part for this reason, we focus more on the signs of the coefficients than on the magnitudes.
In the absence of directly observing the cause of exit, we instead rely on
suggestions from economic theory to inform us which causes predominate. The theory
suggests that the cost of the principal to remove an agent is a key factor.

Hypothesis 2: Where the principal’s cost of ousting the regulator is lower, there will be
more regulatory exit.

Rejecting Hypothesis 2 would indicate that regulatory exit has little to do with ousting
and instead is driven mainly by retirements or other apolitical career concerns.
26

Similarly, a commissioner may leave during a term due to political pressure or seeing ―the hand writing
on the wall‖ without formally being removed from office, and we would consider that to be an ousting by
our definition as well.
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Observed variables that pertain to θ, the cost of ousting, include the method of
commissioner selection, how much the leeway the state governor has to remove
commissioners from office, and a measure of how liberal is the citizens‘ ideology. We
assume that regulators appointed by governors are easier to oust, because recall elections
for regulatory officials are expensive and require organization of a disperse interest group,
compared to the relative ease with which a governor can act. For the latter, we create a
binary variable strong governor, which takes a value of one if the governor can remove
commissioners without a trial or the concurrence of the state legislature.27 About half the
states have a strong governor by this definition. Strong governors have a lower cost of
ousting than do other governors or voters. We also a collected a measure of citizen
ideology, CI (originally on a 100 point scale; 0 = extremely conservative, 100 =
extremely liberal, although we apply a logit transform to the variable in the regressions)
by state and year from Berry et al. (1998; data updated through 2005 on the authors‘
website). Relying on literature from empirical political science showing that activism is
associated with liberal political ideology,28 we assume that the cost of ousting is lower
where the electorate is more liberal.29 We expect that commissioners are more
susceptible to ousting when their views differ more from those of the citizens.
The theory also suggests that where π is lower and congruence is less likely,
ousting is less likely:

27

We created the strong governor variable from information in the NARUC Yearbooks cited above and
from additional checking of state statutes and constitutions. Removal is usually ―for cause‖ except in a few
states where removal can be ―at will‖.
28
Levenson and Miller (1976) state that ―[P]ast research has indicated that activism is positively related to
a liberal political ideology….‖
29
Cost, in this case, encompasses both psychic and organizational costs.
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Hypothesis 3: Where commissioners are less likely to hold preferences that are
congruent with those of the governor and the electorate, there will be more
regulatory exit.

We expect that commissioners are less likely to be congruent, and therefore more
likely to be ousted, when their party affiliation differs from that of the governor and when
the governor at time of reappointment did not originally appoint the commissioner.30 We
can test the effect of congruence of the commissioner‘s and the median voter‘s ideology
in the state only indirectly. The measure of liberal citizen ideology (CI) described above
can reflect small differences in political attitudes, but for commissioners only the political
party affiliation is available. If all commissioners were at the extremes of the ideological
spectrum, then we would assume that increases in CI would lead to more congruence
with and less ousting of Democrat commissioners, and less congruence with and more
ousting of Republican commissioners. To the extent that commissioners are not
ideological extremists, this conclusion is blurred, because (for example) increases in an
already liberal state‘s CI may move citizens further from a commissioner who is a
moderate Democrat. Furthermore, Hypothesis 2 indicates that even for Democratic
commissioners, a more liberal citizenry may lead to more ousting. Thus, a weaker
prediction is that any positive impact of ideology on ousting will show up stronger for
Republican commissioners than for Democrats.
An important question is whether regulators exit because they are ousted or
because of capture and the revolving door. While there is no explicit revolving door in
the model, if the enticement of capture is the source of the dissonance rent we can
30

Data on governors and their party affiliations are from answers.com.
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associate capture with parameter r. We cannot measure dissonance rent or the regulated
industry‘s contribution to it directly. However, we proxy systematic changes in r across
time and states with an indicator for state having a restriction on how quickly former
commissioners can take jobs with firms in the regulated industry (revolving door
restrictions).31 About three-fifths of the states have such restrictions. Ceteris paribus,
states with such revolving door restrictions have a lower present value of the gains from
dissonance than other states.32 If capture is the source of dissonance rent and the
motivation for regulator exit, then revolving door restrictions will be negatively
correlated with exit. If exit is due to ousting unrelated to capture, then revolving door
restrictions will not be negatively associated with exit. Thus, the sign and significance of
this variable can suggest whether politically motivated ousting or capture predominate in
the data.

Hypothesis 4 (null – D40): Commissioners leave involuntarily because they are ousted
for political reasons after raising prices.
Hypothesis 4 (alternative – D4A): Commissioners leave because they are captured and
take advantage of the revolving door.

We include other variables in the regressions that are not directly motivated by
the theoretical model. While there is no exogenous parameter reflecting the degree of
31

Information on the laws governing the removal of commissioners from office and the time restrictions on
the revolving door to industry is taken from NARUC Yearbooks, and supplemented with data helpfully
shared with us by Marc Law. Where data were in conflict between the sources, we generally gave
precedence to the NARUC Yearbooks. See Law and Long (2011) for a description of the alternate data
source.
32
We do not associate the revolving door restrictions with  because the discount factor pertains to more
than just the revolving door offer in the model.

16

Hauge, Jamison, and Prieger

Oust the Louse

accountability in Besley‘s (2006) model, it is reasonable to expect that when a
commissioner can be held more accountable for the actions of the entire commission that
there will be more ousting. We have two proxy variables for how accountable the
regulator is for outcomes. One is whether the commissioner is in the majority party of
the PUC, under the assumption that members of the minority party are outvoted more
often. Another is the size of the PUC. If the commission has more members, then any
individual member is less responsible for outcomes, because the probability that the
individual is the median voter is lower. Larger PUCs therefore correspond to less
individual accountability and less ousting.

Hypothesis 5: Where commissioners can be more readily identified as responsible for
commission actions, there will be more regulatory exit.

The regressors of interest are summarized in Table 1, where the expected impacts
are with reference to the hypotheses above. We supplement the dataset with US Census
estimates of state population to control for heterogeneity in market size, per capita
income, and the status of electricity deregulation in the state.33 These variables are
included as control variables only, and absorb some of the main relevant differences
among states. Summary statistics for all the data are in Table 2.
The final implication of the political economy model is that ousting leads to
prices that are lower than the counterfactual world of no political discipline. First,
ousting a dissonant regulator leads to a chance that the replacement will be congruent the

33

Deregulation status data is from the EIA, following links available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restructure_elect.html.
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next period. Second, in the ―oust the louse‖ equilibrium, the threat of ousting deters
dissonant regulators from raising prices, as long as their dissonance rent is not too large.
The model thus implies that ousting leads to lower future prices, because of regulatory
turnover and the demonstration that ousting is a credible threat.

Hypothesis 6: Past ousting leads to lower regulated prices.

IV. Empirical Model for the Determinants of Ousting
We are interested in modeling the determinants of a commissioner‘s tenure at a
PUC, which comprises two parts: the present term and possible re-appointment or reelection to a subsequent term. We associate leaving mid-term or failing to obtain a
subsequent term with leaving office after period 1 in the theoretical model. Since the
commissioner need not serve the entire term, and indeed often does not, we model the
first part of tenure as a duration. To the duration model we append a binary dependent
variable model for the second part, the re-appointment/election outcome. The bipartite
structure of our empirical model thus does not constrain regressors such as electricity
prices to have the same effect on whether a commissioner leaves mid-term and whether
he serves another term.
Let i index commissioners and j index terms served by a commissioner. Let tij be
the duration of commissioner i‘s stay in office for term j and Tij be the term length if
served in full. Thus 0 < tij  Tij. Let yij be a binary variable taking a value of one if the
commissioner was re-appointed or re-elected (zero otherwise), and dij be an indicator
taking a value of one if the commissioner served his entire term and was eligible (by
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statute)34 in that term for re-election or re-appointment (zero otherwise). Let f(t) be the
density function for the duration process, the hazard rate (the rate at which tenure ends
given that it did not end before time t) of which may depend on the contemporaneous
level of time-varying covariates (regressors) xij(t). We take f to be the Weibull
distribution, and so the hazard rate at t is
h(t;xij(t)) = pexp(xij(t)′)t p-1

(1)

where  is an unknown coefficient vector to be estimated and p is a shape parameter
determining the duration dependence of the distribution.35 Let rij be the probability that
yij = 1, which also depends on regressors. We model rij with probit regression.36 The
likelihood of an observation (tij,yij) is then



1( tij Tij )
Tij


1( t T )
1( y 0 ) 1( y 1)

L(tij , yij )   f (tij ) ij ij 1   f ( s)ds 
1  rij  ij rij ij



0





1( dij 1)

(2)

The covariates are not made explicit in the notation to avoid clutter. The first part (in the
curly braces) takes the form of a standard right-censored duration model. In this
application, the mass at the censoring point Tij (which looks like the contribution of a
right-censored spell to the likelihood) is the probability that term ij is served to
completion. The second part of equation (2) in the square brackets is the likelihood for a
binary dependent variable estimation, but only for the observations where the
34

Only three states have term limits that affected commissioners serving during our study period. In
Arizona, commissioners could serve no more than one consecutive term during 1992-2000 and no more
than two consecutive terms thereafter. In Montana, commissioners could serve no more than 8 years in any
16 year period after 1995. In New Mexico, commissioners could serve no more than two consecutive terms
after 1996. Term limits potentially affected only 10 opportunities for reappointment or reelection in the
data.
35
Equation (1) is the ―proportional hazards‖ specification of the Weibull model. When p > 1, the hazard
function increases with time (positive duration dependence); p < 1 leads to a declining hazard and negative
duration dependence.
36
Thus with regressors zit and coefficients , p(zit′) = (zit′), where  is the cumulative normal density
function.
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commissioner actually could have served another term. If the stochastic processes
generating tit and yit are independent, which we maintain for simplicity, each part of the
likelihood can be consistently estimated by itself. Joint estimation can improve
efficiency if common covariates enter both parts of the likelihood.37
For actual estimation, the likelihood for the duration part of the model has to be
adjusted to account for time-varying covariates and for the fact that tit is often not
observed directly but is instead interval censored.38 The censoring occurs because for
some commissioners we know they left office between two dates but do not know exactly
when. These complications in estimation, which do not affect the interpretation of the
hazard rate coefficients in (1), are explained in the appendix.
We do not include state fixed effects in the regressions because revolving door
restrictions never changes during the sample period in about half the states, other key
variables (such as appointed, large PUC, and) vary over time in only a handful of states,
and strong governor varies only in the cross section. All estimation, however, include
two-way fixed effects for the 11 North American Electricity Reliability Council (NERC)
regions and years.39 Thus, in our ―laboratory of the states,‖ identification of the impacts
of the political economy variables comes from deviation from national trends across time
within a state and from variation among states within the same region. Using regional
instead of state-level fixed effects is a compromise between pure cross-sectional and
within-unit identification. Other political economy studies of regulation have also used
37

Given that joint estimation changes only the standard errors, not the coefficient estimates (because while
regressors may appear in both the duration and probit models, no parameters are common to both), and that
the improvement in the p-values of the estimates was small, we do not report the results from the joint
estimation.
38
Our work appears to be the first application in the economics literature of hazard rate modeling for
interval-censored data with time-varying covariates.
39
See http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/chg_str_fuel/html/fig02.html for a map of the regions.
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regional instead of state fixed effects (e.g., Quast, 2008). We comment on the results of
adding state fixed effects in the results below.
In the absence of state fixed effects, it is possible that some of the political
economy variables are endogenous. For some variables, endogeneity would appear to be
unlikely. For example, state law usually determined strong governor long before the
sample period and sometimes applies broadly to removing any state appointee, not just
utility commissioners, and so is unlikely to be endogenous in an ousting regression. For
other variables, such as revolving door restrictions, endogeneity may be more
problematic (but even there, the law usually pertains to state employees generally). In
such cases, it is best to interpret the results as illuminating correlations in the data to test
whether they are in accord with theory, in the spirit of reduced-form estimation, rather
than as precisely measuring the causal impact of a structural parameter.

V. Empirical Results
As described above, we separately estimate whether a commissioner serves his
full term and whether he is re-appointed or re-elected. The reader may refer to Table 1
for a summary of how the regressors relate to the hypotheses. In the final part of the
section, we look at whether past ousting affects future electricity prices.

a. Mid-term Ousting – Main Results
The results of the hazard rate regressions for being ousted mid-term are in Table 3.
We investigate prices rather than margins because complete cost data are not available.
However, we control for cost in part by including the index of fuel input prices. In the
first few estimations, we do not control for any variables related to the party affiliation of
the commissioner, to allow use of the full sample. In Estimation D1 (with D for duration
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model) we use residential electricity prices (in logs), and apart from prices do not include
any of the other political economy variables related to the theoretical model. The
reported coefficients are exponentiated, to show the proportional effect on the baseline
hazard rate from a unit increase in the variable. Thus figures greater than one imply a
higher likelihood of ousting.
Higher retail electricity prices significantly increase the hazard rate of the
commissioner. Its multiplier of exp( = 2.138 means that an increase of one unit in the
log price slightly more than doubles the hazard rate. Stated in elasticity terms, an
increase of one percent in the residential price increases the hazard rate by  = 0.76
percent. Thus, higher prices appear to lead to ousting and we accept Hypothesis 1. This
conclusion is the same whether prices are in nominal or real terms.40 We also verified
that replacing the current prices and cost index with one-year lagged variables leads to
the same results. Most of the control variables besides cost are individually insignificant.
We leave them in the estimation because they are jointly significant (p = 0.012) and
because they help capture differences among states. The Weibull shape parameter is
significant, and is estimated to be about 0.5 in logs, which implies p = 1.6.41
In estimation D2, we add the industrial electricity price in the specification, for
the reasons discussed above regarding Hypothesis 1. The hazard rate increases with
industrial prices, and by more than from residential prices. In accord with Becker‘s
(1987) notions of effective interest groups, the impact (a multiplier of 2.26) is significant

40

Since price is in logs and year fixed effects are included, the coefficient on nominal and real log prices
are identical.
41
The significance of p implies that it is not appropriate to use an exponential duration model, because
there is evidence of duration dependence. Since p > 1, the hazard of being ousted increases with time. This
may be due to a simple ―record‖ effect: with more time in office, a commissioner has a larger accumulated
record of decisions to which the principal may object.
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and much larger than the residential price effect in the same estimation, which is
insignificant.
In estimation D3, reported in Table 4, we add the other political economy
variables pertaining to the theoretical model, except those involving the party affiliation
of the commissioner. In the model, the parameters π, θ, and so forth determine the
regulator‘s choice of prices, and therefore including prices in the empirical model along
with the variables proxying for the primitives of the model is redundant. We therefore
drop the price variables in the following estimations.42 Our focus in estimation D3 is on
the direction of the effects of the political economy variables, to allow us to both test
implications of the model (Hypotheses 2, 3, and 5) and help differentiate between the two
explanations for regulatory exit (Hypothesis 4).
Ousting is 61% more common in states with appointed commissioners, in accord
with Hypothesis 2. When the governor has authority to remove commissioners
unilaterally (strong governor), the hazard rate is 46% higher, lending further support to
Hypothesis 2 and the model. Without the party variables in the specification, we do not
test Hypothesis 3 yet.43
The effect of the revolving door restrictions is to increase the hazard rate by 39%,
in accord with null Hypothesis 4. If industry uses the revolving door to reward
commissioners who raise prices, then we would expect that the hazard rate would be
42

The issue is similar to reduced form estimation of a supply and demand system. After solving for price
and quantity in terms of the primitives of the model, only the primitives are included as regressors in
reduced form estimation. However, the magnitude and significance of the coefficients on the variables of
interest in estimations D3-D5 change little even if we do include the price variables.
43
We could add the variable for the current governor being the same as at the beginning of the term to test
Hypothesis 3, even though we expect this variable to have more effect at the time of reappointment or reelection. If we add this variable to estimation D3, its coefficient is in the direction in accord with D3 but is
insignificant, probably because there is not a lot of variation in the variable (since during much of a
commissioner‘s term the original governor is still in office). The likelihood barely improves with the
addition of the variable, and the other coefficients change little.
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larger in states that have no restrictions on how soon former commissioners can join
firms in a regulated industry, the opposite of our finding. While not a definitive test of
capture theory versus ousting, the result does suggest that the latter is more prevalent in
the data. Regarding commissioner accountability, we find that when the commissioner
serves on a PUC with five or more members, the hazard rate is 24% lower. The finding
is in accord with Hypothesis 5.
We add the party affiliation variables in estimation D4, which requires dropping
the observations for which the commissioner‘s party is unknown. The political economy
coefficients that were also in estimation D3 have little change in their magnitudes and
retain their significance, although the estimates for large commissions and revolving door
restrictions lose a significance star due to the smaller sample size. For the new variables
to test Hypothesis 2, the more liberal the citizen‘s ideology, the more ousting, for both
Democrats and Republican commissioners. Furthermore, the coefficient is larger for
Republicans, in accord with Hypothesis 3.44 The other new variable testing Hypothesis 3
is for the commissioner having the party affiliation of the governor. When the governor
and the commissioner are not in the same party, the commissioners are less likely to serve
out their terms, but the effect is too small to be significant (although its direction is in line
with the hypothesis). Regarding the new variable pertaining to commissioner
accountability and Hypothesis 5, we find that when the commissioner is in the majority
party, the hazard rate is 34% higher, although the coefficient is significant only at the 10%
level.

44

The coefficient for Republicans is significantly larger than that for Democrats, with a one-sided p-value
of 0.09.
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With the inclusion of two-way fixed effects, identification of the impacts of the
political economy variables comes from deviation from national trends within a state and
variation among states within the same region. Apparently this latter source of variation
is important in the hazard estimations (unlike our finding below for the reappointment/re-election regressions), for if we replace the regional fixed effects in
estimation D4 with state fixed effects, none of the variables in the model retain
significance. Therefore, while the ―laboratory of the states‖ reveals interesting and
suggestive correlation between the political economy variables and ousting, the
laboratory within the states apparently does not have enough variation in ousting and the
regressors with which to work. The results including state fixed effects are strong for the
probit estimations, as we show below.

b. Mid-term Ousting – Robustness Tests
The results in the previous section give support to each of the hypotheses
following from the political economy model of ousting. Before turning to the model for
re-appointment or re-election, we examine the determinants of not completing a term
further to check the robustness of our conclusions. First, one may suspect that
commissioner salary may be an important determinant of whether commissioners serve
their full terms instead of seeking employment elsewhere. It is also worth investigating
whether salary is correlated with the political economy variables in the specification, for
if so the estimates may be biased. For example, perhaps in states with revolving door
restrictions, it is more difficult to attract high-quality talent to public service, so that
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commissioners have fewer qualifications or less experience, and are ousted more for
making poor decisions.45
Our investigation found no comprehensive publicly available data on the salaries
of individual commissioners. However, the Book of the States serial published by the
Council of State Governments, a source used by other researchers, reports the salary of
the ―chief administrative official‖ in charge of public utility regulation. This would
appear to be the chair of the commission. However, in some states the chair earns a
higher salary than other commissioners, and the Book of the States reports salary ranges
for only a few states. Some of the salary data are not updated each year, and we
interpolated in such cases.
Examination of the correlation between salary and the political economy variables
does not indicate cause for concern. Log salary has positive correlation greater than 0.1
with the following variables only: appointed (corr. = 0.21), revolving door restrictions
(0.47), CI×Democrat (0.23), and large PUC (0.14). The other political economy
variables show little correlation with log salary. If higher salaries lead to less exit, then
omitting salary from the estimation may bias the coefficients of these positively
correlated variables downward.46 With the exception of the final variable, however, this
bias would be against the confirmation of the hypotheses above. It is also notable that
salaries tend to be higher where there are revolving door restrictions, perhaps as a
compensating differential to attract higher quality talent to public service.
Even though the discussion above indicates that omitting salaries are not likely to
cause incorrect acceptance of the hypotheses, except perhaps for the large PUC variable,
45

Several of the robustness tests in this section were suggested by anonymous referees.
Of course, this statement is only heuristic, as correlation among the entire set of regressors in a multiple
regression makes the direction of omitted variable bias indeterminate in general.
46
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we add log salary to estimation D5 (also in Table 4). There are no changes in the
direction of the impacts of the political economy variables, although some of the
significance levels change. Commissioner in majority party becomes significant at the 5%
level. The salary impact itself is insignificant, and none of the conclusions above change.
Perhaps the largest change is for the coefficient for revolving door restrictions, which as
expected increases in size and gains significance at the 5% level.47
The unobserved quality of the regulator may also be an important omitted factor.
Presumably, some regulators prove to be inept or corrupt and rightfully lose their office.
Thus, perhaps a strong governor exercises the option to oust a commissioner because of
demonstrated incompetence rather than dissonant preferences. We refine our
specification in two ways to lend credence to the political economy model as the
explanation for ousting. First, we repeat estimation D4 but interact the strong governor
variable with an indicator for the commissioner serving a second or higher term, under
the assumption that it is likely that incompetence or corruption would have become
known during their first term. The results (not reported) show that the coefficient for a
strong governor during a commissioner‘s initial term (eβ = 1.26, p = 0.19) is even lower
than during subsequent terms (eβ = 1.41, p = 0.02). Thus, the apparent impact of the
strong governor variable does not appear to be only an artifact of quality differences
among regulators.
In a second test to check whether strong governors oust mainly for reasons of
dissonant preferences, we repeat estimation D4 with an interaction between strong
governor and same governor, an indicator for whether the current governor is the same as
47

Since the salary variable is usually really the chair‘s salary, we repeated estimation D5 interacting salary
with an indicator variable for whether the commissioner was serving as chair. While the impact of salary
was stronger for chairs (p-value = 0.10), no other results changed.
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when the term began. Presumably, the degree of preference alignment is greater when
the commissioner was appointed by (or at least began office under) the current governor.
The results (not reported) show that the coefficient for strong governor × same governor
(eβ = 1.39, p = 0.07) is lower than the coefficient for strong governor × different governor
(eβ = 1.59, p = 0.01), as congruence of preferences in the model suggests.
Finally, we argued above that it is appropriate to leave the electricity price out of
the estimations with the political economy variables, since these are reduced form
regressions and model predicts that prices are determined by the other variables.
Nonetheless, we examined the results of adding the residential electricity price from
estimation D1 to the specification from estimation D4. As expected, once controlling for
the political economy variables, the price coefficient is insignificant (although the
coefficient is still positive). Changes in the other coefficients were negligible, there were
no changes in significance levels, and an LR test rejects the need for including the price
variable.
We also perform a falsification test directed at Hypothesis 4. Since we do not
include state fixed effects in the model, it may be the case that revolving door restrictions
proxies a political climate in the state where commissioners are over scrutinized and
undervalued, leading to more turnover. We explored how the political economy variables
would affect another high-level state board member: the university regent. Since public
university regents ―regulate‖ a not-for-profit, state-run enterprise, there is nothing
equivalent to the revolving door between the PUC and private industry. Thus, the
indicator for PUC revolving door restrictions, even if they apply generally to all state
employees, should not be significant when applied to university regents‘ tenures. Given
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that regents are still politically appointed or elected, the other political economy variables
related to the cost of ousting or the degree of accountability should still be in line with
our other hypotheses, however.
Finding data on university regents proved to be much more difficult than for PUC
commissioners. However, we were able to find complete enough data on regents‘ term
dates from a variety of sources to assemble a dataset covering 832 terms of 609 regents
from ten states.48 The results of a specification similar to estimation D3 are in Table 5.49
Whether region fixed effects are included (estimation D6) or not (estimation D7),
revolving door restrictions has no significant effect. To make sure the result is not driven
by a single state in our small sample, we repeated estimation D6 ten times leaving out
each state in turn; in no iteration was revolving door restrictions significant at even the
20% level.50 For the other political economy variables, appointed and strong governor
still increase the hazard, in accord with Hypothesis 2, and larger regent boards are still
associated with longer tenure, in accord with Hypothesis 5.51
We also replicated estimation D1 for an additional falsification test (results not
shown), for electricity prices should have nothing to do with the tenure of university
regents unless prices in reality only proxy for omitted factors affecting the political
economy of a state. The residential electricity price coefficients were insignificant as
expected, whether region fixed effects were included (eβ = 0.65, p = 0.64) or not (eβ =
0.95, p = 0.94).
48

See note to Table 5 for the list of covered states.
We used D3 instead of D4 because party data were not available for regents.
50
The insignificance of the coefficient is also not due merely to the smaller sample size. Even if there were
as many observations as in estimation D3, a simple adjustment of the standard error in line with root-N
asymptotics suggests that the coefficient would still lack significance.
51
We again use the median board size as the threshold for a ―large‖ board. Whereas for PUCs this was
four members, for regent boards it is eight.
49
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c. Ousting at the End of a Term
We turn now to the second part of the model for ousting, that for re-appointment
or re-election. The results from the probit model for commissioners who served out their
terms and did not face binding term limits are reported in Table 6. Apart from the price
variable, we include similar variables as in the hazard estimations except we do not
include strong governor, since mid-term removal from office is not at issue here. We
also include another political variable, same governor, which here is an indicator for
whether the governor at time of re-appointment or re-election is the same as when the
preceding term began.
Table 6 reports the marginal effects from the probit estimations, which are the
increase in the probability (expressed in percentage points) of re-appointment or reelection.52 Initial exploration of the data found that log residential electricity prices best
entered the specification by allowing the bottom 5% of outliers their own slope
coefficient, and so in Estimation R1 prices enter as a spline with the knot at the fifth
percentile of the price distribution.53 For all but the bottom 5% of prices, for which there
is no significant effect, higher residential electricity prices are significantly associated
with a lower probability of serving another term. Every percentage increase in the
electricity price in that range reduces the likelihood of serving another term by 21
percentage points, in accord with Hypothesis 1. As in the hazard estimations, several of
the control variables are insignificant, but we again leave them in the estimation to absorb

52

Replacing probit with logit estimation does not change any of our conclusions in Table 6.
We investigated the nonlinearity in the marginal effect of residential prices on serving another term with
a generalized additive model (GAM, see Hastie and Tibshirani (1990)), allowing prices to enter the
specification nonparametrically. The plot of the fitted relationship revealed that there is no effect of prices
below the 0.05 quantile of prices and a nearly strictly linear negative relationship above that quantile.
53
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some of the heterogeneity among states remaining after the inclusion of the regional fixed
effects.
In Estimation R2, we drop the price variable and add the political economy
variables except for those related to the commissioner‘s party.54 Being appointed instead
of elected is associated with a 14.2 percentage point drop in the probability of serving
another term, in accord with Hypothesis 2. The large size of this effect may also be due
to the well-known incumbency advantage enjoyed by elected officials (Ansolabehere and
Snyder, 2002). Based on the incumbency effect for regulators of about six percentage
points estimated by Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002),55 it appears unlikely that all of the
effect we observe is merely due to the advantage of incumbency when the position is
elected.
When the same governor is in office as at the start of the previous term, there is a
17.2 percentage point increase in the probability of serving the new term again, in accord
with Hypothesis 3. Revolving door restrictions has no significant impact, and so we do
not reject null Hypothesis 4. When the commissioners serve on a larger board, they are
more likely to serve again, as implied by Hypothesis 5. The latter effect is insignificant
in estimation R2, but gains significance at the 10% level in estimations R3 and R4 once
the party regressors are included.

54

If we leave the price variable in estimation R2, it is significant at the 10% level.
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2002) are the only researchers we found who consider the incumbency
advantage for state regulatory officials, although they group them with other ―lower‖ state officers. Gordon
and Landa (2009) review several factors that may lead to an incumbency advantage, including the
campaign discount (it is ―less costly for an incumbent to run for reelection than for a challenger to mount a
campaign‖), pro-incumbent endorser bias (created ―from the unique opportunities officeholders have to
cultivate relationships with influential interest groups or elites‖), and district partisan bias toward the
incumbent‘s party. The latter is not likely to be important for PUC elections, since commissioners typically
represent the entire state.
55
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In estimation R3, we add the party-related variables, causing a small reduction in
the sample size. For the new variables, the citizen ideology coefficients are negative for
commissioners of both parties, in accord with Hypothesis 2, although the effect is
significant only for Democrats. While the coefficient on liberal ideology is larger for
Democrats, the estimates are not precise enough to reject the hypothesis that the true
coefficient is larger for Republicans (one-sided p-value = 0.16), and so Hypothesis 3 is
not supported, it is not rejected. In line with Hypothesis 3, on the other hand, same
governor has a positive impact. While the effect for being in the majority party is
insignificant, being in the same party as the governor is significantly associated with a 7.3
percentage point increase in the probability of serving a succeeding term. The latter is
also in accord with Hypothesis 3.
In summary, the results from the empirical investigation of regulators leaving
office—both mid-term and at time of re-appointment or re-election—generally support
that the cause of exit is ousting in accord with the political economy model. The results
also suggest that the revolving door plays a minor role compared to ousting. While not
every regressor in every specification has a statistically significant impact in the direction
suggested by theory, many do, and none of them has a significant impact that points in
the other direction.

d. Ousting at the End of a Term – Robustness Tests
As with the hazard estimations, we examine the determinants of serving a
succeeding term further to check the robustness of the results of our hypothesis tests. We
add log salary to estimation R4 (also in Table 6). There are no changes in the direction,
magnitude, or significance of the political economy estimates. The salary impact is
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significant, in the expected direction: a one percent increase in salary leads to an 18.4
percentage point increase in the probability of serving again. In another check, we add
electricity prices back into the specification from estimation R3 (results not reported).
The second spline component of price, while smaller, retains significance (marginal
effect = -18.7, p-value = 0.04). There are no changes in the direction of the impacts of
the other political economy variables, although the coefficients for CI × Democrat and
large PUC lose a significance star.
Even though several of the political economy variables have little variation over
time, in estimation R5 we replace the regional fixed effects with state fixed effects.
Without relying on cross-sectional variation within regions to identify the impacts of the
political economy variables, the significance level of many of them falls. However, none
of the coefficients changes sign, and the coefficients for large PUC and revolving door
restrictions gain significance. The latter is in the direction predicted by null Hypothesis 4.

e. The Impact of Ousting on Regulatory Behavior
We close our empirical work with a final question: does ousting effectively deter
future dissonant regulatory behavior? If ousting does not curb the approval of higher
electricity prices, then there would be little point in punishing regulators by ousting them,
apart from gratifying a principal‘s desire for retribution. In the estimations in Table 7, we
regress prices on past ousting to test Hypothesis 6. In these panel regressions, the unit of
observation is a state and the dependent variable is the log of real electricity prices.56
Since regulators are likely to consider recent experience in the state regarding ousting as
more germane to their pricing decisions than ousting from long ago, we construct a
56

We convert all monetary variables to real terms because we do not include year fixed effects in
estimations P1-P3.
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measure, past ousting, that weights recent years most heavily. In particular, treating the
amount of mid-term and end-of-term ousting in the state and year as a flow, past ousting
is the stock of ousting from the beginning of the sample through the previous year, with a
ten percent depreciation rate.57
The specification of the model requires care, for the preceding results demonstrate
that higher prices are positively correlated with ousting. Thus, one of the expected
effects of a larger amount of past ousting is a higher price level. To control for ousting‘s
impact before the current period on the price level, we add the lagged price to the model.
Doing so allows the coefficient on past ousting to reflect only the impact on the forwardlooking behavior of the regulators.
In the first price regression, we include regional fixed effects as before. We do
not include year fixed effects for comparability with the following estimations.
Estimation P1 in Table 7 shows that higher past ousting is associated with lower prices in
the period, after controlling for the lagged price level, fuel cost, and other control
variables. The coefficients from these log-linear regressions are multiplied by 100 in the
table, to express in percentage points the marginal impact on the dependent variable of a
one-unit increase in a regressor. A unit increase in past ousting is associated with a 2.2%
lower price.58 Although the estimate is significant, there are reasons the figure might be
biased. Because of the presence of the lagged dependent variable, for consistency the
model requires that there is no serial correlation in the error terms, which may not be the
57

We tested the stationarity of past ousting before using it as a regressor. The null hypothesis of a unit root
common to all panels was soundly rejected with the tests of Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) and Harris and
Tzavalis (1999), where we used the BIC to determine the number of lags for the tests.
58
Note that while the coefficient implies that an extra ousting at period t-1 lowers price in period t by 2.2%,
the dynamics in the model also imply that the impact of a one-period change in ousting is carried forward
to all future periods. Since the coefficient on lagged price is positive, the lower price in period t results in a
price lower than otherwise in period t+1, and so forth.
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case since the estimation does not include panel fixed effects. Another reason to include
state fixed effects is that there may be many unobserved determinants of electricity prices
within a state that vary within the region. Adding state fixed effects also helps account
for the unobserved initial stock of ousting in a state.
In estimations P2 through P4, we include panel fixed effects. Since standard
fixed effects models are inconsistent for dynamic panels, we use Blundell and Bond‘s
(1998) GMM system estimator for dynamic panel data. In the GMM estimator, lagged
differences in y instrument for lagged y in a level equation, and lagged y instruments for
Δy in a second equation that is differenced to remove the fixed effects.59 Given the
theoretical model and the ousting estimations, we suspect that the error term in the price
regression may have feedback on future realizations of past ousting. That is, shocks that
increase prices in one period may lead to ousting, which will increase future values of
past ousting. An advantage of the GMM framework is that we can treat past ousting as
weakly predetermined instead of strictly exogenous, and assume only that the error term
is uncorrelated with past realizations of the regressor. The estimations also account for
the presence of residual serial correlation of up to two lags in differenced model.60
The result in estimation P2 is again in accord with Hypothesis 6, for past ousting
still has a negative and statistically significant impact on prices. However, the coefficient
falls to less than half of its magnitude from P1. The Hansen J statistic fails to reject the
59

The Blundell and Bond (1998) model performs better than the more familiar Arellano and Bond (1991)
estimator for dynamic panels when the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is near unity. We
performed the estimations with the xtabond2 package in Stata 11.
60
Arellano-Bond (1991) and Hansen J tests rejected the hypothesis of no first and second order serial
correlation in estimations P2-P4, which leads us to exclude an extra two lags from the instrument set for the
lagged dependent variable. We also limited the number of lags included as instruments to avoid the
problems of using too many instruments that be describe below. In particular, we used Δyt-3 and Δyt-4 to
instrument yt-1 in the level equation, and yt-4 and yt-5 to instrument Δyt-1 and past oustingt-2 and past oustingt-3
to instrument for Δpast oustingt in the differences equation. The other differenced regressors serve as their
own instruments.
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validity of the instruments. In estimation P3, we add political economy variables as
regressors. The coefficient on past ousting falls a bit but remains significant. Most of the
additional variables are insignificant, except for revolving door restrictions, which has a
negative impact on prices. This finding is consistent with the ousting estimations, which
showed that revolving door restrictions was associated with more ousting, which the
present estimations show leads to lower prices.
To avoid using too many instruments, which can lead to bias in the coefficients
for the endogenous variables and low power of the instrument validity tests (Roodman,
2009), we do not include year fixed effects in estimations P2 and P3.61 The exclusion of
year fixed effects also allows past ousting to evolve naturally within each state, which
may be important to the interpretation of its coefficient.62 To test whether year fixed
effects change any conclusions, we add indicator variables for three-year periods in
estimation P4.63 The impact of past ousting rises; now a unit increase in last period‘s
ousting is associated with a 3.1% lower price the next period. While the inclusion of the
extra instruments may bias the estimate, it is nevertheless the case that across the range of
models we find consistent support for Hypothesis 6.64

61

Each regressor requires another instrument in the GMM, and with a complete set of year indicator
variables the number of instruments is about the same or greater than the number of panels. If year fixed
effects are included in estimations P2 and P3, the Hansen overidentification tests have a p-value of 1.0,
which is a sign of severe overfitting of the endogenous variables (Roodman, 2009). Since we cannot
include a full set of year fixed effects, we verified that including a linear time trend did not remove the
significance of the coefficient on past ousting in estimations P2 and P3.
62
Adding year fixed effects is the same as demeaning each regressor year by year across the states, which
would destroy the time series properties of past ousting, which are important because it is a stock variable.
63
We cannot add fixed effects for pairs or single years without the number of instruments approaching or
exceeding the number of panels and resulting in signs of overfitting the model (Hansen statistics near 1.0)
(Roodman, 2009).
64
We also explored other depreciation rates—0, 5, and 15%--in the construction of past ousting. As the
rate falls, the statistical significance of the coefficient rises, perhaps indicating that regulators have long
memories when it comes to ousting.
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VI. Conclusions
Our empirical results support the five hypotheses stemming from the political
agency model of ousting. Retail electricity prices are associated with ousting, both midterm and at time of selecting for a second term. A greater cost of ousting and a greater
prevalence of congruent regulators are associated with less exit, in accord with the
theoretical model. Where accountability is higher, there is more ousting. Furthermore,
the finding that revolving door restrictions on post-regulatory employment is associated
with more ousting suggests that politically motivated ousting is more likely than a
revolving-door story as the main reason for turnover. Past ousting also appears to
discipline regulators‘ decisions, leading to lower future prices, although the magnitude of
the effect is mild.
While we have presented evidence that political principals can apparently bring
pressure to bear on regulators through ousting, we have not addressed the question of the
optimal degree of control the principal should exert over the regulator. Insulating the
regulator from political interference is important to preserve regulatory credibility and
commitment. The ability of the regulator to commit to prices and policies is important in
the presence of long-lived capital investment, to avoid the hold-up problem (Newbery,
1999).65 Cambini and Rondi (2010) find that the higher the degree of independence
among European regulatory institutions, the higher is the associated investment by the
regulated firms.66 In part for this reason, PUCs in the US were established as
independent regulatory agencies (Schuler, 1996). On the other hand, commitment can

65

When public utility regulators cannot commit to long-term policies, they have incentive to reduce the
prices that the regulated utilities are allowed to charge after the firm has sunk its investment. Recognizing
this time inconsistency problem, regulated utilities may invest less than is optimal.
66
See Trillas (2010) for a survey of related empirical work on regulatory independence, which generally
comes to similar conclusions.
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lead to bad policies being locked in when the regulator may not be benevolent.67
Armstrong and Sappington (2006; sec. 4.5) discuss why complete independence of the
regulator is not optimal when capture is a possibility, and Martimort (1999) shows that a
higher potential for capture may call for placing stricter constraints on the regulator.
In general, the regulator‘s independence, which allows it to act contrary to the
wishes of the principal, may either increase social welfare (when the principal does not
want prices to reflect cost) or decrease it (when the principal wants prices to be aligned
with cost). In existing empirical studies of regulated industry performance or investment,
regulatory independence, however measured, typically enters the econometric models in
linear fashion. Thus, the corpus of empirical work (see Trillas (2010) for a review)
generally finds that ―more independence is better‖ with models that do not allow for
nonlinear impacts of regulatory oversight. A promising avenue for future research would
be an empirical examination of whether (and which) regulatory institutions embody the
optimal amount of independence.
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Econometric Appendix
Here we present further details on the duration estimation for mid-term ousting.
There are two complications not reflected in equation (2) in the main text. First, some of
the covariates entering hazard rate specification (1) vary between years, and thus vary
over the tenure of commissioners whose service spans more than one calendar year (timevarying covariates). Second, some observations are censored. Right censoring occurs in
the data for two reasons. As mentioned in the text, commissioners serving their full term
are never ousted and are treated as right-censored observations at time of term end.
Furthermore, terms still in progress at the end of the observation period for the data are
also right censored. Less common in duration data models is the interval censoring of
some of the observations. When a commissioner disappears from the NARUC yearbooks
before his term ends, the publication does not state the date he left office. Thus, in the
absence of other information, we only know that the commissioner's tenure ended at
some point between the record dates of the last yearbook listing the commissioner and the
first yearbook not listing him. In some cases, we can narrow the range of the interval of
departure, using data from Beecher (2007), the starting date of the succeeding
commissioner, or other information we found through extensive searching of PUC
websites and news media. Thus, we have duration data that may be completely observed,
right censored, or interval censored. The likelihood for interval-censored Weibull
duration data with time-varying covariates is presented in Sparling et al. (2006), who
work out the likelihood for a more general parametric model that nests the Weibull. We
estimate the model via MLE in Stata 11.1 (using the default options for the ―lf‖ method,
which include using the Newton-Raphson maximization method with numeric
derivatives), which converged readily in all specifications.
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Table 1: Expected impacts of regressors on ousting
Related to
Variable
parameter
Residential price
p
Industrial price
p
Commissioner is

appointed
Strong governor

Liberal citizen

ideology
Liberal citizen
π
ideology
Commissioner and
governor in same
π
party
Same governor as at
π
start of term
Revolving door
r
restrictions
Revolving door
r
restrictions
Commissioner is on
a*
a large PUC
Commissioner is in
a*
majority on PUC

Related to
hypothesis
1
1

How
related
x   p
x   p

Expected impact under
Hypothesis
More exit
More exit than for residential p

2

x

More exit

2

x

More exit

2

x

More exit

3

xπ

More exit for Republicans
than for Democrats

3

xπ

Less exit

3

xπ

Less exit

4 (null)

xr

More exit or no effect

4 (alt.)

xr

Less exit

5

xa

Less exit

5

xa

More exit

*Parameter a refers to accountability.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Data
Variable
Data for Mid-Term Ousting Analysis
Retail residential electricity prices
Retail industrial electricity prices
Commissioner is appointed
Strong governor
Revolving door time restrictions
Commissioner’s party = majority pty
PUC has > 4 commissioners
Cmmssr’s party = governor’s pty
Citizen ideology score CIit
CIit x Democrat commissioner*
CIit x Republican commissioner*
Commissioner’s party = Democrat
Commissioner’s party = Republican
Commissioner’s party = Other
Deregulation is active
Deregulation is suspended
State per capita income, log
State population, log

Mean

Std. Dev.

Minimum

Maximum

6.901
4.383
0.714
0.505
0.607
0.681
0.413
0.585
46.971
25.605
18.752
0.568
0.389
0.043
0.068
0.007
9.620
15.001

2.738
1.981
0.452
0.500
0.488
0.466
0.492
0.493
15.206
25.412
24.940
0.495
0.487
0.203
0.252
0.086
0.629
1.044

1.075
0.337
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
6.860
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
7.954
12.664

23.347
17.957
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
95.972
95.972
91.566
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
10.982

Data for Re-appointment/Re-election
Analysis
Re-appointed/re-elected
0.494
0.500
0.000
Retail residential electricity prices
7.005
2.725
1.145
Commissioner is appointed
0.697
0.460
0.000
Revolving door time restrictions
0.587
0.493
0.000
Cmmssr’s party = majority pty
0.675
0.468
0.000
PUC has > 4 commissioners
0.445
0.497
0.000
Cmmssr’s party = governor’s pty
0.551
0.498
0.000
Citizen ideology score CIit
46.971
15.273
6.860
CIit x Democrat commissioner*
26.369
25.113
0.000
CIit x Republican commissioner*
17.737
24.850
0.000
Same governor as previous term
0.469
0.499
0.000
Commissioner’s party = Democrat
0.591
0.492
0.000
Commissioner’s party = Republican
0.364
0.481
0.000
Commissioner’s party = Other
0.045
0.206
0.000
Deregulation is active
0.079
0.270
0.000
Deregulation is suspended
0.010
0.101
0.000
State per capita income, log
9.652
0.608
7.954
State population, log
14.978
1.024
12.695
*Variable is divided by 100 and passed through a logit transform to create a regressor.
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1.000
23.347
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
91.236
91.236
86.465
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
10.982
17.402
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Table 3: Hazard Rate Estimation for Leaving Mid-Term

Y=time until ousted
Regressors of interest
Residential electricity prices, log

Estimation D1
exp()
(s.e.)

Estimation D2
exp()
(s.e.)

2.138**
(0.735)

0.949
(0.494)
2.256**
(0.832)

1.057
(0.083)
0.544*
(0.178)
0.915
(0.585)
0.631
(0.246)
1.191***
(0.073)
0.479***
(0.048)
-2100.1
24.4 (6) 0.000
1,164
1,816

1.035
(0.076)
0.520**
(0.170)
0.763
(0.498)
0.567
(0.221)
1.215***
(0.073)
0.480***
(0.043)
-2098.0
31.07 (7) 0.000
1,164
1,816

Industrial electricity prices, log
Other control variables
Fuel input cost index, log
Deregulation is active
Deregulation is suspended
Per capita income, log
State pop, log
Weibull shape parameter (log)

Likelihood
2
 statistic (d.o.f.) and p-value
Clusters (commissioners)
N
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Exponentiated coefficients are reported, which can be interpreted as the multiplier on the hazard
rate. Robust standard errors for the multipliers are in parentheses (clustered on the individual). Estimation
is censored Weibull duration regression (see appendix). Two-way fixed effects for years and the 11
Electricity Reliability Council regions are included but not reported. 2 statistic is for the null hypothesis
that all regressors (excluding fixed effects) have zero coefficients (degrees of freedom are in parentheses).
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Table 4: Hazard Rate Estimation for Leaving Mid-Term

Y=time until ousted
Regressors of interest
Appointed
Strong governor
Citizen ideology x
Democrat commissioner
Citizen ideology x
Republican commissioner
Commissioner and
governor in same party
Revolving door restrictions
Large PUC (> 4
commissioners
Commissioner in majority
party
Commissioner salary, log
Other control variables
Fuel input cost index, log

Estimation D3
exp()
(s.e.)
1.612**
(0.311)
1.463**
(0.223)

1.386**
(0.208)
0.763**
(0.095)

1.104
(0.079)

Republican commissioner
Independent/other party
commissioner
Deregulation is active
Deregulation is suspended
Per capita income, log
State pop, log
Weibull shape parameter,
Log
Likelihood
2
 stat (d.o.f.) and p-value
Clusters (commissioners)
N
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
See notes to previous table.

0.562
(0.202)
1.547
(0.968)
0.371*
(0.221)
1.274***
(0.093)
0.471***
(0.050)
-2051.5
43.7 (9) 0.000
1,164
1,816
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Estimation D4
exp()
(s.e.)

Estimation D5
exp()
(s.e.)

1.511**
(0.300)
1.464**
(0.239)
1.332**
(0.179)
1.778***
(0.362)
0.916
(0.130)
1.330*
(0.216)
0.797*
(0.103)
1.337*
(0.200)

1.547**
(0.312)
1.481**
(0.238)
1.249*
(0.169)
1.575**
(0.311)
0.897
(0.126)
1.422**
(0.228)
0.805*
(0.102)
1.346**
(0.203)
0.799
(0.311)

1.158
(0.106)
0.987
(0.124)
1.055
(0.304)
0.534*
(0.194)
1.354
(0.865)
0.598
(0.192)
1.206**
(0.091)
0.486***
(0.049)
-1937.5
61.5 (15) 0.000
1,074
1,683

1.120
(0.091)
0.973
(0.121)
1.009
(0.288)

1.103
(0.375)
1.198**
(0.095)
0.490***
(0.054)
-1946.5
35.86 (14) 0.001
1,074
1,683
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Table 5: Hazard Rate Estimation for Regents Leaving Mid-Term
Estimation D6
Estimation D7
p-value
p-value
Y=time until regent is ousted
exp()
exp()
Regressors of interest
Appointed
3.711**
0.011
3.091***
0.000
Strong governor
27.407***
0.000
5.149***
0.000
Revolving door restrictions
0.694
0.313
1.257
0.396
Large board (> 8 regents)
0.447***
0.006
0.621**
0.030
Other control variables
Per capita income, log
12.823*
0.068
15.678***
0.004
State pop, log
2.058**
0.039
0.961
0.640
Weibull shape parameter, log
0.154*
0.053
0.153*
0.055
Likelihood
-929.6
-938.9
2
 stat (d.o.f.) and p-value
28.49 (6) 0.000
56.03 (6) 0.000
NERC region fixed effects
yes
no
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Both estimations have 609 clusters (regents) and N=832. Regents are included from the Alaska
Board of Regents, the Regents of the University of California, The Trustees of Indiana University, the
Regents of the University of Minnesota, Montana University System Board of Regents, University of
Nebraska Board of Regents, the Ohio Board of Regents, The University of Texas System Board of Regents,
the Utah System of Higher Education Board of Regents, and the University of Virginia Board of Visitors.
See also notes to previous table.
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Table 6: Probit Estimation for Re-appointment or Re-election
Y = 1 if Re-appointed or
re-elected, 0 if not
Regressors of interest
Res. electricity prices, log
(spline: bottom 5%)
Res. electricity prices, log
(spline: top 95%)
Appointed

Marginal effects × 100 (with std. errors in parentheses)
Estimation Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
R1
R2
R3
R4
R5
27.392
(26.144)
-21.182**
(8.403)
-14.18***
(3.95)

Citizen ideology x
Democrat
Citizen ideology x
Republican
Commissioner and
governor in same party
Same governor as
previous term
Revolving door
restrictions
Large PUC (> 4
commissioners
Commissioner in majority
party
Commissioner salary, log
Other control variables
Fuel input cost index, log

17.20***
(2.84)
-2.53
(3.51)
3.78
(3.17)

2.710*
(1.393)

1.40
(1.28)

5.836
(6.634)
9.094
(14.828)
-9.815
(7.740)
-4.333***
(1.619)
-804.5
39.8 (7) 0.00
0.081
1,263
848

4.01
(6.71)
5.76
(16.13)
-6.04
(7.57)
-5.45***
(1.71)
-779.0
39.8 (7) 0.00
0.099
1,247
840

Republican commissioner
Independent/other party
commissioner
Deregulation is active
Deregulation is
suspended
Per capita income, log
State pop, log

-11.04***
(4.11)
-7.18**
(3.56)
-2.30
(4.29)
7.31**
(3.31)
16.03***
(3.09)
-0.95
(3.71)
5.70*
(3.27)
-0.82
(3.30)

-12.13***
(4.19)
-7.12**
(3.55)
-2.45
(4.30)
7.22**
(3.30)
16.32***
(3.09)
-2.07
(3.77)
6.29*
(3.29)
-1.15
(3.30)
18.42**
(9.16)

-21.44*
(11.90)
-8.92*
(4.77)
-6.57
(5.45)
6.10*
(3.23)
14.76***
(3.11)
-10.33*
(5.62)
11.08**
(4.56)
-0.58
(3.17)

1.26
(1.33)
-1.51
(3.02)
-4.46
(5.75)
3.24
(6.76)
6.80
(15.37)
-5.25
(7.91)
-5.83***
(1.89)
-709.0
48.3 (13) 0.00
0.108
1,147
772

1.61
(1.35)
-0.85
(3.05)
-4.60
(5.75)
3.89
(6.77)
7.16
(15.51)
-18.86*
(10.38)
-7.68***
(2.06)
-707.1
52.3 (14) 0.00
0.110
1,147
772

1.97
(2.78)
-3.12
(2.93)
-8.77
(5.94)
0.81
(6.76)
3.59
(15.85)
-10.26
(8.37)
-17.85
(15.19)
-665.8
33.0 (13) 0.00
0.162
1,147
772

Likelihood
2
 statistic (d.o.f.) and p-value
Pseudo R squared
N
Clusters (commissioners)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Notes: Marginal effects are the change in the probability of serving a directly succeeding term from a one
unit change in x (calculated as the average in the sample), expressed in percentage points. Marginal effects
are calculated with the derivative for continuous x and discrete changes for discrete x. Robust standard
errors for the marginal effects are in parentheses (clustered on commissioner). Marginal effects for the
spline in prices measure the slopes for the relevant interval in prices. Two-way fixed effects for years and
regions are included but not reported. See previous table notes on 2 statistic.
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Table 7: Dynamic Panel Estimations for Electricity Prices
Y = real residential electricity
price, log
Regressor of interest
Past ousting
Other control variables
Lagged real residential
electricity price, log
Appointed

Coefficients × 100 (with std. errors in parentheses)
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
Estimation
P1
P2
P3
P4
-2.150**
(0.862)

-0.789**
(0.314)

-0.695**
(0.331)

-3.273***
(0.661)

25.011***
(6.486)

69.254***
(4.985)

6.263***
(1.383)
-12.343***
(3.207)
-14.280
(12.596)
-81.362***
(12.593)
9.531***
(2.191)

2.078*
(1.160)
-3.723***
(1.113)
-4.874
(4.163)
-28.962***
(6.263)
22.074***
(4.145)

69.266***
(5.039)
0.214
(0.450)
0.194
(1.365)
-0.266
(0.466)
0.619
(0.503)
-1.438***
(0.376)
2.088*
(1.164)
-3.500***
(1.125)
-4.626
(4.216)
-31.562***
(5.646)
23.588***
(3.769)

ERC region

state

state

85.124***
(7.891)
1.197
(1.033)
-0.678
(1.380)
-0.490
(0.624)
0.610
(0.576)
-2.191**
(0.846)
1.468
(1.014)
-3.583***
(1.121)
-2.658
(4.335)
-19.303***
(5.673)
13.684***
(3.716)
state & 3year groups
2 lags
endogenous

Citizen ideology
Governor Democrat
Governor independent
Revolving door
restrictions
Fuel input cost index,
log (real)
Deregulation is active
Deregulation is
suspended
Per capita income, log (real)
State pop, log
Fixed effects

Serial correlation
none
2 lags
2 lags
exogenous
endogenous
endogenous
Treatment of ousting
2
R
0.604
2
34.7 (7,50)
F or  statistic (d.o.f.)
2,589.5 (7)
2,143.6 (12)
5,155.1 (12)
p-value
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Hansen overID stat. (d.o.f.)
5.09 (4)
3.90 (4)
3.38 (4)
p-value
0.278
0.419
0.496
N
1,730
1,730
1,696
1,696
Number of instruments
11
16
27
Clusters for SE’s
51
51
50
50
Notes: An observation is for a state in a year. The first test statistic is F for estimation P1 and χ2 for the
others; the latter excludes coefficients for year fixed effects in estimation P4. P-values are for the statistic
in the row above. The second test statistic is Hansen‘s statistic with null hypothesis that the overidentifying
restrictions are valid in the GMM estimations. A constant is included in P1. Std. errors are robust to
clustering at the state level. Real variables are deflated with the CPI-U.

50

